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The Suppression of Bookie Gambling by a Denial of
Telephone and Telegraph Facilities
Renewed attempts to prevent the use of telephone and telegraph
facilities in connection with gambling have raised the question whether
utility service can be legally withheld from such users as bookmakers
and wire news services. The theory behind any such action must be that
the prohibition of discrimination among the customers of a utility does
not require extension of service to those using it for illegal purposes.
For convenience the topic here discussed will consider only whether and
how service may be denied to those using it in connection with off-track
("bookie") betting on horse races; moreover, the prohibition by most
states of gambling is assumed to indicate that such activities are un-
desirable.'
Nature of the Use of Communications
The individual bookie makes extensive use of his telephone to reach
customers and otherwise conduct his business. Denial of this vital
facility would obviously hamper a boolde's activities. But, the center of
the national bookmaking syndicate is said to be the wire news service.
Off-track bookmaking requires information as to present track odds,
exact off time, results, prices paid, jockey changes, late scratches, and
track conditions. This material is furnished by the Continental Press
Service which obtains the information at the track, arranges and trans-
mits it over leased telegraph wires to local "drops" or receivers which
transfer the news by telephone or teletype to the eagerly waiting bookie,
all within approximately a minute and a half.2 This system, through
I For an excellent discussion of gambling practices, history, and the effects of
syndicated gambling upon law enforcement, see Peterson, Gambling-Should It Be
Legalized? (Published by Chicago Crime Commission, 1945).
2 California Commission on Organized Crime, Second Progress Report (1949) 6.
Historically, the Payne Telegraph Service early in this century started a wire
service of news from race tracks. Mont Tennes of Chicago was given exclusive
rights in the Chicago area, by which means he perfected control of bookies and
eventually took over the wire service on a national scale. In 1927 Moe Annenberg
bought into Tennes' company, by 1934 uniting all the 13 competing companies into
a national monopoly, of which he was exclusive owner by 1937. Pennsylvania opened
an attack upon Annenberg's interests in 1938 (reportedly for political reasons),
and in 1939, as part of the income tax investigations, the U.S. Attorney in Chicago
requested A. T. & T. to withdraw wires leased to Annenberg's Nationwide News
Service. A. T. & T. is alleged to have leased these same wires back to Annenberg
confederates under their own names, so that in 1940, after Moe Annenberg was in
jail for income tax evasion, the federal authorities took further steps to cut off the
news service. Since then the history of racing news has been highlighted by the
James Ragen and "Buggsy" Siegel killings of recent years. In 1948 the California
authorities began a new drive against the news service, and other states have taken
this up. Ibid. (discussion of California activities); Pennsylvania Utility Com. v.
Bell Tel. Co., 25 P.U.R. (N.S.) 452 (Pa. P.U.C. 1938) (history of wire service).
That racing news is big business is shown by the fact that Nationwide News Service
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its monopoly position, is a means of organizing the gambling syndicate,
for non-subscribing bookies who rely on newspapers and radio are at a
disadvantage, being unable to settle quickly with their customers, lacking
essential information such as late scratches or present odds, and risking
the possibility of taking bets after a race has been run from customers
who have learned of the winner elsewhere.8 Obviously, the removal of
communication facilities would ruin the news service, thus seriously ham-
pering the operations of bookies, and perhaps destroying the organization
of the gambling syndicate itself.
Action of this type is not easily undertaken. Since the common law
and most utility statutes require non-discriminatory service, withdrawal
of facilities must depend upon some theory of unlawful use. The ille-
gality of bookmaking is clear, but the most practical benefit will accrue
from striking directly at the news service itself.4 Unfortunately, how-
ever, few courts have held rapid transmission of racing news to be illegal.
The general opinion seems to be that the provider of such information
is not criminally liable because his customers misuse it. 5 The only excep-
tions to this have been a few attempts to charge a conspiracy of news
providers with bookies to violate the gambling laws.6 Otherwise specific
legislation has been required to make the news service itself illegal.
7
Although criminal actions against the news services have been gener-
ally unsuccessful, the courts have sanctioned a denial of the use of tele-
graph wires to the news service on the theory that illegal use of the infor-
mation after it is transmitted makes the transmission itself unlawful if
ranked only behind Associated Press, United Press, I.N.S., and R.C.A. as A. T. &
T.'s largest customer. Flynn, Smart Money, Colliers, January 11, 1940 (a four
part, rather wordy, biography of Moe Annenberg).
3 Cal. Com. on Crime, Second Progress Report (1949) 4. The Chicago Crime
Commission Claims that Continental Press is now operated by the survivors of the
Capone syndicate. Cf. Stearns v. Court, 62 Nev. 102 142 P. (2d) 206 (1943) (im-
portance of news service suggested by suit to enforce "exclusive" right to racing
news in Las Vegas).
4 Withdrawal of telephone service from bookies is at best an indirect method of
attack, which seems most useful where the police may tap wires and thus hear bets
being placed without necessarily identifying the culprit. Cf. Cullen v. New York
Tel., 94 N.Y.S. 290 (App. Div. 1905) (service denied where place had bad repute);
Hiegel v. New York Tel., 195 N.Y.S. 332 (1922) (denied to apartment house where
various renters used phone to place bets); In re Knapp, 83 N.Y.S. (2d) 919 (1948)
(employer permitted employee to take bets). Effect upon bookie activity of cutting
off the wire service is noted in Cal. Com. on Crime, Second Progress Rep. (1949) 18.
5 Kreling v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. (2d) 884, 118 P. (2d) 470 (1941) (racing
news publication not a public nuisance); Hagerty v. Coleman, 133 Fla. 363, 182
So. 776 (1938) (not a crime). The cases cited at note 8 infra all state that providing
such news is not a crime.
6 People v. Corica, 55 Cal. App. (2d) 130, 130 P. (2d) 164 (1949) (indictment of
news service operator and bookies in conspiracy to conduct gambling). In 1939
and 1940 the operators of the news service and a few bookies were indicted for
conspiring to violate the anti-lottery law, 28 Stat. 963 (1895), (readopted, 62
Stat. 862 (1948), 18 USCA §1301 (USC Cong. Serv. 1948)). It was charged that
people did not bet on a horse but upon the number which the wire reported as
being the winning horse-a lottery. This ingenious attempt was ultimately dis-
missed in the federal court for the Northern District of Illinois in 1940, but by
that time threat of the indictment had driven .Annenberg out of business and
caused the telephone and telegraph, companies to cut off the wire service. Nation-
wide News Service v. A. T. & T. (N.D. Ill. 1940, unpublished opinion) (the key
case refusing to enjoin A. T. & T. from withdrawing wires).
7 New Jersey Stat. Ann. (1939) c. 171-3 (illegal to transmit news or messages
to help anyone carrying on an illegal business); Pa. Stat. (Purdon, 1941) §1703
et seq. (laws passed in the 1938 and 1939 attack upon Annenberg); Code of the
City of Chicago (1939) c. 191-9 (illegal to publish odds or tips on horse races).
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it is for the purpose of such illegal use.8 This requires that the recipients
of this information use it illegally before the communication of the in-
formation can be said to be wholly tainted with unlawfulness. It has
generally been presumed that most of the subscribers to the news service
are conducting illegal enterprises, for the news service was designed for
the specific tdsk of rapidly conveying technical information capable of
only the narrowest use, since few non-gamblers need quick and detailed
news of this nature, and even fewer could afford the requisite one hun-
dred dollars a week.9 Some difficulty has arisen around those "drops" of
the news service which distribute their material to local bookies by hav-
ing the bookie call up the office over the regular telephone when he wants
news. Since the offices of many racing news sheets provide similar facili-
ties for readers to call up for late news, and some "drops" have com-
bined these practices, at least two courts have been unable to find that
there is sufficient illegal use of news in these cases to render the trans-
mission unlawful.' 0 It is always a question of fact in each case whether
there can be enough legitimate users to preclude action against the news
provider, but once it has been established that the use is illegal, the
question arises as to who can take action.
Action by the Utslity Company
In some states, the telephone companies have voluntarily adopted the
practice of discontinuing service upon police notification of illegal use
by the subscriber.. Usually the company also states that it will act upon
its own finding of illegality, but as a practical matter most action is
initiated by police findings. In the field of interstate transmission and
the leasing of wires, Western Union, A. T. & T., and the Bell System
8 McBride v. Western Union, 171 F. (2d) 1 (C.A. 9th 1948) (illegal use of the
facilities means illegal use by anybody on either end of wire, not just illegal use
by the particular person leasing from the utility); Application of Annette, 74
N.Y.S. (2d) 330 (1945), appeal denied, 298 N.Y. 498, 82 N.E. (2d) 44 (1948)
(knowledge of future illegal use of information makes its transmission unlawful);
Cullen v. Ohio Bell Co., 36 P.U.R. (N.S.) 152 (Ohio Com. P1. 1940) (illegal nature
of bookie customers of wire service taints the whole business).
9 California P.U.C. Decision No. 41415 (April 6, 1948) (telephone companies
ordered to withdraw service to wire service); Partnoy v. Southwestern Bell, 70
P.U.R. (N.S.) 134 (Mo. P.S.C. 1947) (customers of wire service all presumed
to be bookies).
l0 Pennsylvania Publications v. Pennsylvania Ut. Com., 349 Pa. 184, 36 A. (2d)
777 (1944) (since other than bookies may call for information, and since only the
winners are revealed, this system was not the same as the wire service; opinion notes
that Ut. Com. thought this merely a ruse to evade prohibition of wire service);
H & R Publishing Co. v. Illinois Bell, 26 Ill. Commerce Com. 155 (1946) (10 tele-
phones to give late news-company may not deny service unless customer actually
convicted of crime).
1iAt present the following states follow this practice: California, Connecticut,
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
and possibly Pennsylvania. See, Solomon v. So. Cal. Tel. Co., 61 P.U.R. (N.S.) 525
(Cal. RR. Com. 1945); Cologiavanni v. So. New Eng. Tel., 65 P.U.R. (N.S.) 171
(Conn. P.U.C. 1946); United Sound System v. Ill. Com. Com., Order No. 36077
(1948), appealed to Superior Court of Cook County; Howard Sports Daily v.
Weller, 179 Md. 355, 18 A. (2d) 210 (1941); Rodman v. New Eng. T. & T., 61
P.U.R. (N.S.) 242 (Mass. D.P.U. 1945); Re Michigan Bell, 34 P.U.R. (N.S.)
65 (Mich. P.S.C. 1940); Partnoy v. Southwestern Bell, 70 P.U.R. (N.S.) 134 (Mo.
P.S.C. 1947); Berenato v. N.J. Bell, 76 P.U.R. (N.S.) 1 (N.J.D.P.U. 1948);
Shillitani v. Valentine, 296 N.Y. 161, 71 N.E. (2d) 450 (1947); Cullen v. Ohio
Bell, 36 P.U.R. (N.S.) 152 (Ohio Com. P1. 1940); Pennsylvania Publications v.
Pennsylvania P.U.C., 349 Pa. 184, 36 A. (2d) 777 (1944).
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companies have all adopted tariff provisions similar to the following
regulation of A. T. & T.:
"The service is furnished subject to the condition that it will not
be used for an unlawful purpose. Service will not be furnished if
any law enforcement agency, acting within its jurisdiction, advises
that such service is being used or will be used in violation of law,
or if the Telephone Company receives other evidence that such
service is being or will be so used.''12
Authorization for such company regulations is found in the rule which
developed in general utility law that customers, if they have any right
or property in utility service at all, have a right conditioned upon legal
use.13 This right of the utility to prevent illegal use of its facilities by
withdrawing service is not considered to be unreasonable discrimination
which is generally forbidden.'4 Although recognizing such a right to
prevent illegal use, some courts have held that transmission of gambling
messages is not unlawful because these messages are said to become
illegal only after receipt by the bookie, but most courts do not try to
decide this nice question of just when the action becomes illegal, holding
rather that it is all one unlawful process.15
Since denial of service must rest on the company's right to prevent
unlawful use of its property, logically the company itself should initiate
the practice. However, some courts feel that this is improper since it is
likely to constitute the utility a censor of public and private morals.16
This is not the general view, and some courts will even go so far as to
talk of a duty rather than a right in the utility to cooperate in law en-
forcement. 17 All jurisdictions seem to agree that the company may
12 By letter of Jan. 6, 1949, the F.C.C. requested that A. T. & T. and the Bell
System file tariffs, pointing out that Western Union's tariff had been upheld in
McBride v. Western Union, 171 F. (2d) 1 (C.C.A. 9th 1948). There is some indi-
cation of a similar request in 1945, probably following the F.C.C.'s study of the
effect of illegal users upon the shortage of telephone facilities. Cologiavanni v.
So. New Eng. Tel. Co., 65 P.U.R. (N.S.) 171 (Conn. P.U.C. 1946) (company
adopted rule pursuant to 1945 request of F.C.C.).
13 Bryant v. Western Union, 17 F. 825 (C.C. Ky. 1883) (two years after tele-
type invented company permitted to refuse to give market quotations to bucket
shop); Thurston v. Union Pacific, 23 Fed. Cas. 1192, No. 14019 (C.C. Neb. 1877)
(notorious card sharp may be put off train despite duty as common carrier to take
all passengers); Godwin v. Carolina T. & T., 136 N.C. 258, 48 S.E. 636 (1904)
(house of prostitution cannot demand telephone service). 1 Wyman, Public Service
Corporations (1911) §607.
14 Cf. Nichols, Public Utility Service and Discrimination (1928) 188-198.
15 People v. Brophy, 49 Cal. App. (2d) 15, 120 P. (2d) 946 (1942) (illegal actions
of bookie occur after transmission); Dooley v. Coleman, 126 FIa. 203, 170 So. 722
(1936) (same); Commonwealth v. Western Union, 112 Ky. 355, 67 S.W. 59 (1901).
McBride v. Western Union, 171 F. (2d) 1 (C.C.A. 9th 1948) (weight of authofity
recognizes that transmission is unlawful).
16 Western Union v. Ferguson, 57 Ind. 495 (1877) (company may not censor
message "send me four girls, on first train"); Gray v. Western Union, 87 Ga.
350, 13 S.E. 562 (1891) (only threat of prosecution excuses refusal of message).
Fear of censorship seems to apply more to refusal of single messages than discon-
tinuance of entire service. Western Union v. Hammond Elevator, 165 Ind. 492, 76
N.E. 100 (1905) (not required to give "ticker" service to bucket shop) ; Edwards
v. Ashland Tel. Co., P.U.R. 1918C, 691 (IMI. 1918) (continued usage of profanity
over phone will permit discontinuance but just a few bad words will not allow
cutting off). That the general rule is opposed to the first part of this note, see
note 11 supra.
17 Hamilton v. Western Union, 34 F. Supp. 928, 929 (Ni.D. Ohio 1940) (duty of
company to cooperate in cutting off Annenberg wire service system); Application of
Manfredonio, 52 N.Y.S. (2d) 392 (1944) (duty of company to obey police requests).
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discontinue service if it is threatened with prosecution for providing
facilities to designated users.18
Once the company's right to initiate discontinuation has been estab-
lished, there still remains a possibility that abandonment of service must
be approved by the state utility commission.1 9 Although this require-
ment does not usually refer to discontinuation of service to individual
customers pursuant to valid regulations of the company, any possible
doubt could be satisfied by obtaining approval of the commission upon
the original adoption of such a practice.
20
Upon withdrawal of service the customer will have recourse either to
the public utility commission to complain of discrimination or to a court
of equity for an injunction or mandamus to restore service, at which
time the company must show that its facilities are likely to be illegally
used in the future. A preponderance of the evidence will satisfy the
company's burden, for this is not a criminal action to punish the cus-
tomer for past acts of his but is an attempt by the company to prevent
future improper use of its property.2 1 Of course, this probable future
use must be inferred from past use. Since the company's action is
usually based upon a police request for discontinuation, generally the
procedure followed is for the police to present their evidence of illegal
use in behalf of the company. This is necessary because the company
may not evade its responsibility for providing equal service to all by
blindly following the request of others.22 In line with this theory the
District of Columbia court held recently that the Bell System tariff pro-
viding for withdrawal of service upon police notification cannot be fol-
lowed as it reads', for the company can discontinue service only upon
reasonable proof of unlawful use and it must assume the risk that police
requests are supported by proper evidence.
23
18 Hagerty v. So. Bell, 145 Fla. 51, 199 So. 570 (1940) (permitted discontinuance
to part of Annenberg system despite previous Florida decisions contra); Gray v.
Western Union, 87 Ga. 350, 13 S.E. 562 (1891) (dictum); Kronenberg v. So. Bell,
36 P.U.R. (N.S.) 513 (W.D. La. 1940) (Annenberg system again).
19 Cf. Nichols, Public Utility Service and Discrimination (1928) 50-60 (collects
cases requiring approval of commission).
20 Be Michigan Bell, 34 P.U.R. (N.S.) 65 (Mich. P.S.C. 1940) (request of ap-
proval of change permitting company to discontinue service at request of police);
Solomon v. So. Cal. Tel. Co., 61 P.U.R. (N.S.) 525 (Cal. RR. Com. 1945) (customer
can not complain about rule of company permitting discontinuance at police request
since he had previous opportunity before approval to object).
21 In re DiBenedetto, 83 N.Y.S. (2d) 920 (1948) (good discussion of procedure:
presumption that citizen entitled to service, which company must rebut with pre-
ponderance of evidence showing future misuse can be inferred); Ganek v. New
Jersey Bell, 57 P.U.R. (N.S.) 146 (N.J.P.U.C. 1944) (reasonable cause to believe
future misuse justifies denial). Cf. People ex rel. Restmeyer v. New York Tel. Co.,
159 N.Y.S. 369 (1916) (affirms denial of service even though customer was dis-
charged by magistrate from charge of bookmaking); Hiegel v. New York Tel.
Co., 195 N.Y.S. 332 (1922) (acquittal). Contra, H & R Publishing Co. v. Illinois
Bell, 26 1l. Commerce Com. 155 (1946) (company may not discontinue service
unless customer convicted of crime).
22 Shillitani v. Valentine, 296 N.Y. 161, 71 N.E. (2d) 450 (1947) (police com-
missioner not proper party defendant in suit to prevent discontinuation of service
because it is company alone which has acted); Cologiavanni v. Southern New Eng.
Tel. Co., 65 P.U.R. (N.S.) 171 (Conn. P.U.C. 1946) (police evidence fails to show
that customer is misusing wires). But of. Rodman v. New Eng. T. & T., 61 P.U.R.
(N.S.) 242 (Mass. D.P.U. 1945) (withdrawal not unreasonable if done at police
request, but if done on company's own information then commission will inquire
into proof).
23 Anderson v. Potomac T. & T., 17 L.W. 2535 (Dist. Ct. D.C. 1949).
[Vol. 40
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Some courts have distinguished between the amount of evidence nee-
essary only to excuse the company from any penalty for withdrawing
service and that proof necessary to support a continued denial to the
customer.2 4 Although the fact that the police request discontinuation
may justify the company's original action, all the available evidence
should be presented to determine whether denial should be continued.
The utility companies may hesitate to precipitate action if there is any
danger of their being sued for damages or for whatever statutory penalty
is provided to prevent improper discrimination. This has occurred.
2 5
To avoid this, where damages are based upon breach of contract, the
company can protect itself by making discontinuation a published regu-
lation governing all service contracts; but, where the courts permit a
tort action for loss of service, or there is an additional statutory penalty,
the company might zot be permitted to preclude liability through con-
tract provisions. 26 Approval by the regulatory commission of a regula-
tion precluding liability in case of such action has been used to avoid the
threat of damage suits.
2 7
Action by Law Enforcement Agencies
In practice the requests of the law enforcement authorities that the
communications companies cooperate with them in eliminating unlawful
use of wires seem to have been followed by the companies. 28 The federal
authorities did find it necessary in 1940 to threaten prosecution of the
company in order to secure cooperation, and such a threat to prosecute
for furnishing service seems to be the only means available for initiating
action where the requests of the police are not voluntarily followed, for
enforcement agencies cannot directly order the companies to withdraw
service.2 9
Prosecution of the company for furnishing service to illegal users must
be based either upon a charge of aiding and abetting or upon a count
of conspiracy. These theories require that the company have such an
24 Berenato v. New Jersey Bell, 76 P.U.R. (N.S.) 1 (N.J.D.P.U. 1948) (approves
company discontinuation upon request of police but orders service restored because
evidence fails to show it will be misused). Cf. Cal. P.U.C. Decision No. 41415
(April 6, 1948) (requires company to discontinue service upon police request but
provides appeal to P.U.O. for customer).
25 Giordullo v. C. & S. Bell, 71 N.E. (2d) 858 (Ohio Com. P. 1946) (suit for
$50,000 damages; company must prove there was actually gambling because it so
alleged in its answer); Western Union v. Ferguson, 57 Ind. 495 (1877) (awarded
statutory penalty for refusal to send telegram). These cases are the only recorded
ones demanding damages, probably because the facilities for halting the discon-
tinuation of service are so adequate that damages never accrue in sufficient quantity.
26 The theory of damages for loss of service is in a state of flux, some courts
not even certain whether the action is in tort or contract. Cf. the cases collected in
Damages Recoverable from Telephone Company for Failure to Furnish or Inter-
ruption of Service (1923) 23 A.L.R. 952.
27 Re Michigan Bell, 34 P.U.R. (N.S.) 65 (Mich. P.S.C. 1940); Cal. P.U.C. De-
cision No. 41415 (April 6, 1948).
28 The cases cited at note 11 supra all seem to represent voluntary cooperation by
the company.
29 Shillitani v. Valentine, 296 N.Y. 161, 71 N.E. (2d) 450 (1947) (it is the
company which withdraws service from bookies, for the police cannot require
company action). In 1940 the telephone company is alleged to have helped former
associates of Annenberg to re-establish his business, and so the telephone company
was indicted along with the wire service. Fogarty v. Southern Bell, 34 P. Supp.
251 (E.D. La. 1940) (mentioned in case refusing injunction of denial of service
to one of these associates.
1949]
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intent in common with the gamblers to violate the gambling law as to
constitute promoting the crime.30 It has been held that providing facili-
ties with knowledge of their prol~osed use is promotion of the crime and
gives a basis for prosecution of the company.3 1
Besides acting against the company, or prosecuting the users for their
crimes, the enforcement agencies might proceed to enjoin the customer
from using these facilities illegally. This has not been done, but it is
similar to the 1940 attempt in California to enjoin certain individuals
from operating a wire service.3 2 This raises the question whether equity
will enjoin a person from committing a crime, since subsequent impris-
onment for contempt will really be denying a citizen of his right to a
jury trial for criminal punishment. The courts are divided on the answer
to this.33
Power of Regulatory Commissions to Compel Action
Sometimes it has been necessary for the regulatory commissions to
force the utility companies to cooperate with police requests for discon-
tinuation of service. Examples of forcibly overcoming unwillingness to
cooperate are the 1938 attack upon Annenberg's Nationwide News Serv-
ice by the Pennsylvania Utility Commission and the 1948 attack upon
Continental Press Service by the California Commission.3 The practice
of the Federal Communications Commission in demanding the filing of
tariffs stating the procedure the companies intend to follow has resulted
in voluntary acquiescence by the companies to the proposal that they
deny service to illegal users.35
Neither the California nor the Pennsylvania Commission has made
clear from what statute it derived the power necessary to compel com-
pany action. The statutes of these two states make the practices of the
companies subject to the approval of the commission: the California
commission shall change those rules which are "unjust, unreasonable,
unsafe, improper, inadequate, or insufficient"; the Pennsylvania com-
mission may change company rules in the interest of "accommodation,
30 Wharton's Criminal Law (12th ed., Ruppenthal, 1932) 350-368.
31 State v. Scott, 80 Conn. 317, 68 A. 258 (1907) (furnishing a "ticker" to a
gambler makes one an accessory); State v. Western Union, 160 Ark. 444, 254 S.W.
838 (1923) (indictment under statute forbidding messages relating to illegal sale
of cotton futures); United States v. Consumers Power Co. of Michigan, unpub-
lished opinion (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 1940) (heavy fine imposed on utility for furnish-
ing gas to illegal still). See Beamish, Responsibility of Utilities for Criminal
Use of Service (1940) 25 Public Utilities Fortnightly 586 (Commissioner BeamisBi
of Pa. P.U.C. hopefully predicts chastisement of A. T. & T. for helping Annenberg).
32 Kreling v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. (2d) 884, 118 P. (2d) 470 (1941) (reverses
injunction of Annenberg lieutenants from ever gambling or running a wire service).
Apparently some injunctions of this period which were never appealed are still in
force. Cal. Com. on Crime, Second Prog. Report (1949) Appendix G.
33 See the collection of cases in Clark, Principles of Equity (1937) 322-324; Mc-
Clintock, Equity (1936) 285-288.
34 Public Utility Commission v. Bell Tel. Co., 25 P.U.R. (N.S.) 452 (Pa. P.U.C.
1938) ; Cal. P.U.C. Decision No. 41415 (April 6, 1948). That the company helps the
wire service to evade the police is charged by the Pennsylvania Commission; by
Beamish, Responsibility of Utilities for Criminal Use of Service (1940) 25 Public
Utilities Fortnightly 586 (followed by denial by telephone official); by the court in
Fogarty v. So. Bell, 34 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. La. 1940); and by Flynn, Smart Money,
Colliers, Jan. 20, 1940, p. 57.
35 Note 12 supra. This seems to be the general policy of the F.C.C. Cf. Ambas-
sador Inc. v. United States, 325 U.S. 317 (1945) (upholds regulations as to hotel
charges for telephone service which the companies adopted at request of F.C.C.).
[Vol. 40
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convenience and safety.' '6 What positive powers these statutes convey
is undecided, there having been little litigation in this field. Similarly,
the power granted the F.C.C. is to investigate and require adequate and
non-discriminatory service.37 In recent years of insufficient telephone
and telegraph facilities it has been thought that the commissions could
require the companies to make available all their equipment for legal
users.38 Another suggested basis for commission action has been the
theory that serving unlawful users is an unreasonable practice of the
company which the commission may change3 9
There is no reason why the commissions in other states cannot do
likewise if necessary. Generally they can all investigate the practices of
the companies, with the effect any exposal of unhealthy conditions will
have. They can recommend corrections. If there is necessity for positive
command, then the commission may be able to act on the theory that a
company practice to permit illegal use is unreasonable and harmful to
the public interest and the commission is empowered to correct this.
40
Once a company does adopt a rule, either on its own initiative or under
compulsion, the commission generally has power to require compliance
with this regulation.
Of course, legislation could clarify the power of the commission. But,
if the legislature is to act, it would be better that it clearly impose a
duty upon the company to prevent illegal use of its facilities, for the
commission can enforce such a duty.
Constitutional Limitations
Is denial of communication facilities, clearly a drastic step in this
modern age, unconstitutional interference with freedom of speech or
press? 41 The guarantees of the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution and of the various state constitutions were designed to pro-
tect the presentation of news and information that the public may be
enlightened as to all views of a subject.42 In light of this interest there
is a distinction recognized between information which should be avail-
able to the public if the concept of democratic action is to have any
meaning, such as expression of reasons why gambling should be legalized,
and information useable for no public benefit but rather for violating the
36 California General Laws (Deering 1944) Act 6386 §§31, 35, By SCA 13,
amendment to Cal. Const. Art. XII, §22 (1946), Cal. P.U.C. replaces Cal. RR. Com.
in this statute. Pennsylvania Stat. Ann. (Purdon 1941) §§1171, 1172, 1182.
37 48 Stat. 1070, 1076 (1934), 47 USCA §§201-3, 215 (Supp. 1948).
38 Partnoy v. Southwestern Bell, 70 P.U.R. (N.S.) 134 (Mo. P.S.C. 1947).
39 Hamilton v. Western Union, 34 F. Supp. 928 (N.D. Ohio 1940).
40 Cf. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 111 2/3, §8 (commission to ascertain whether com-
pany complies with laws), §32 (promote public safety, health, convenience, and com-
fort), §41 (commission to establish rates, regulations, practices); Missouri Rev.
Stat. (1939) c. 35, §5664 ("adequate", "just and reasonable" practices). See,
Ill. Com. Com. v. N.Y.C. R.R., 398 Ill. 11, 75 N.E. (2d) 411 (1947) (order must
recite that it is necessary for public safety or other interest). Spurr, Guiding
Principles of Public Service Regulation (1924) 104-118.
41 The Constitution restricts governmental action, but action by a utility, par-
ticularly at police request and if approved by the state commission, might be con-
sidered state action. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (enforcement by
court of private contracts is governmental action).




law, like the odds offered on a particular horse in the fifth race at
Jamaica.
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Information that may be restricted is generally defined under the
famous "clear and present danger" test, which describes news immedi-
ately and materially threatening consequences which the state may for-
bid.4 4 In some states this has been interpreted to cover the publication
in any form of racing news, but the United States Supreme Court has
never passed upon this.4 5 Even though one might not condone blanket
prohibition of all racing news, it should be recognized that the wire
service, unlike some of the other publications, rapidly transmits special-
ized information designed for the use of bookies rather than for legiti-
mate customers. Restriction of the wire service is not so much an at-
tempt to prevent the presentation of ideas or facts as it is a denidl of
certain advantages which aid in violation of the law. The bookies are
not prevented from finding out the news, but they are forced to stand on
an equal footing with others who must rely upon the normal news sources.




The record shows that in many states action has been taken to prevent
the use of telephone and telegraph facilities by bookies and by the wire
news service. The theory of this action is that, although a utility must
serve all legitimate customers without discrimination, it is not required
to serve those using its facilities for illegal purposes. If bookmaking itself
is illegal, it would seem clear that using a telephone for this purpose is
also illegal, and it is generally accepted that the company may refuse its
facilities to such a business. The wire news service presents a more diffi-
cult problem. The attempt, in absence of specific legislation,47 is not to
restrict the type of news delivered. That will still be available in news-
paper or radio broadcast.48 The wire service is undesirable because it is
43 Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (1941) 3-35, 145-152. As to whether
legalization of off-track gambling will remedy the conceded practical evils of present
day illegal gambling, see Peterson, Gambling-Should Be Legalized? (Published
by the Chicago Crime Commission, 1945.)
44 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (espionage case in which clear
and present danger test was formulated); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942) (freedom of religion or of speech does not permit violation of ordnance
forbidding use of epithets designed to cause breach of peace).
45 State v. Sykes, 28 Conn. 225 (1859) (advertising of lotteries may be prohibited,
but not news of past ones); Hart v. People, 26 N.Y. 396 (1882) (upholds pro-
hibition of lottery news).
46 Pox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915) (affrmed conviction for publishing
newspaper story about troubles among members of a nudist colony); Howard Sports
Daily v. Weller, 179 Md. 355, 18 A. (2d) 210 (1941) (points out difference between
wire service and ordinary publication of news to the public).
47 Cf. Anti-lottery Law, 28 Stat. 963 (1895), 62 Stat. 862 (1948), 18 USCA §1301
(USC Cong. Serv. 1948). This statute was passed when state attempts to prohibit
lotteries were being evaded through interstate commerce. Today, with the national
spread of bookmaking, probably Congress should again pass a law closing interstate
corridors to those bent on circumventing state laws.
48 Application of Capital Broadcasting Company, FCC 48-288 (Jan. 30, 1948)
(FCC does not have power to require a radio station to cease broadcasting race
results if the rest of the station's program material comes up to the statutory
standards). Cf. 48 Stat. 1091 (1934), 62 Stat. 862 (1948), 47 USCA §326 (Supp.
1948) (censorship of programs prohibited). See 2 Socolow, The Law of Radio
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designed to afford extra advantages to bookies and it is a means of
organizing the gambling syndicate. Discontinuance of wire facilities
used by the wire service requires recognition that the function of aiding
bookies renders the whole process unlawful.
Logically the utility company itself should be able to initiate the prac-
tice of preventing illegal use of its property. Usually it is allowed to do
so, particularly in more recent years.4 9 But some instances do arise
where the company is unwilling to act. In these cases the law enforce-
ment authorities are able to prosecute the company for knowingly aidinig
and abetting illegal gambling. The regulatory commissions in these in-
stances have power to require the company to desist from such an unrea-
sonable and harmful practice which is contrary to the public interest
as revealed in the gambling laws. Altogether, the power to prevent
illegal use is present, and it has been exercised in many instances.
Where gambling is considered illegal, the problems of enforcing the
law and convicting the gamblers are difficult. The task of the police
should not be complicated by permitting the gamblers to use the conven-
iences of modern communications in order to circumvent public policy
as revealed in the laws.
W. K. BACHELDEIh
Broadcasting (1939) 891 (discusses the limitation upon program content); id. at
1015 (discusses state rules).
49 Compare People v. Brophy, 49 Cal. App. (2d) 15, 120 P. (2d) 946, (1942) with
McBride v. Western Union, 171 F. (2d) 1 (C.C.A. 9th 1948); compare Pioneer News
Service v. Southwestern Bell, 61 P.U.R. (N.S.) 47 (Mo. 1945) with Partnoy v.
Southwestern Bell, 70 P.U.R. (N.S.) 134 (Mo. 1947).
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